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suggested ":hat a closed circuit television 
arrangemem based on a 'case-specific find-
ing of nece..sity' would be regarded as 
impermissible under the Confrontation 
Clause, that view was not shared by more 
than four of the justices who sat on the 
case." Id at 280, 544 A.2d at 798. 
Therefore, the Craig court felt com-
pelled by necessity to decide the issue of 
exceptions to the confrontation clause that 
the Supreme Court had chosen to reserve 
for another day. The court, taking guid-
ance from the Court of Appeals' of 
Maryland analysis in Wildermuth and fol-
lowing Justice O'Connor's lead in her con-
curring opinion in Coy, held that: 
(1) the requirement of a face-to-face 
meeting in court is not absolute, but 
does admit of exceptions; (2) where a 
face-to-face meeting would, in fact, so 
traumatize a child-witness as to pre-
vent him or her from reasonably com-
municating, the State may provide for 
the testimony to be taken in a setting 
that, as nearly as practicable, preserves 
all other aspects embodied in the right 
of confrontation, but does not require 
the witness to look directly upon the 
defendant or to testify in his direct 
physical presence; and (3) if § 9-102 is 
implemented in the manner prescribed 
by Wildermuth, the implementation 
will not be deemed so violative of the 
defendant's right of confrontation as 
to constitute reversible error. 
Id at 280-81, 544 A.2d at 799 (emphasis in 
the original). 
The procedure authorized in the 
Maryland statute and used in this case did 
not amount to the kind of face-ta-face con-
frontation that the Supreme Court held 
was envisioned by the sixth amendment. 
The child-witnesses testified from the 
judge's chamber in the presence of a prose-
cutor, the lead defense attorney, and a 
technician, while the judge and everyone 
else remained in the courtroom. The pro-
ceedings were broadcast through a closed 
circuit television setup, with Craig having 
access to her attorney through a private 
telephone line. The court of special appeals 
conceded that if the confrontation require-
ment were absolute as interpreted by 
Justice Scalia, the "procedure [used in 
Craig] would not pass muster." Id at 281, 
. 544 A.2d at 799. However, the court 
emphasized that the requirement was not 
so rigid since "neither the Supreme Court 
nor the Maryland Court of Appeals-the 
two courts that bind us-has ever held any 
. aspect of the Confrontation Clause ... to 
the absolute." Id 
In Wildermuth, the court of appeals held 
that the right to face-to-face confrontation 
was to be tempered by public policy con-
siderations by which the state has a legiti-
mate and compelling interest in 
authorizing the procedure stated in section 
9-102. Articulating that interest more spe-
cifically, the Craig court held that the state 
has a two-fold interest in allowing the testi-
mony of a child abuse victim to be given 
over closed circuit television. Foremost is 
the fact that if the child-witness is so 
traumatized by the confrontation so as to 
be unable to testify, the truth of the matter 
may never be revealed. Secondly, the state 
has a legitimate interest in protecting 
children generally from such trauma. Id at 
282-83, 544 A.2d at 800. 
Craig's second argument was that the 
trial court failed to follow the proper pro-
cedure stated in section 9-102. Citing Coy, 
the court reemphasized that no indivi-
dualized findings were made that the child-
witnesses needed special protection in 
providing face-to-face testimony when the 
Supreme Court overturned that decision. 
The court distinguished Wildermuth in 
that that court's finding was based on testi-
mony as to general perceptions on the dif-
ficulty children may have had testifying in 
court with the alleged abuser's presence. 
Id at 285, 544 A.2d at 801. In the instant 
case, there was specific, focused testimony 
on each child by trained personnel that the 
child-witnesses would have extreme diffi-
culty testifying in the presence of Craig 
which satisfied the requirements of the sta-
tute. 
Finally, the court addressed Craig's 
assertion of right of presence. The Wilder· 
muth court had also considered the argu-
ment that the closed circuit television 
procedure authorized by section 9-102 via-
lated the defendant's common law and due 
process right of presence, because the 
witnesses and defendant were separated 
during testimony. The Wildermuth court 
rejected that contention since the defen-
dant could hear the questions being asked 
and answered, could see the proceedings, 
and could readily communicate with his 
attorney. Thus, the Wildermuth court held 
that "[t]he statutory procedure did not 
thwart a fair and just hearing in terms of 
due process' and there was 'no violation of 
[the defendant's] due process right to be 
present.'" Id at 287-88, quoting Wilder· 
muth, 310 Md. at 529, 530 A.2d at 291. 
Craig had essentially the same setup and 
was given ample opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses. Also, there was no 
violation of the common law right of pres-
ence since it had been modified by statute. 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland has carved out an exception in 
the sixth amendment's confrontation 
clause concerning child abuse cases. Citing 
strong public policy and the state's legiti-
mate interest in protecting children gener-
ally from abuse, the court has made a 
strong statement in both upholding the 
accused's rights but also protecting child-
witnesses from being traumatized by the 
courtroom experience. 
- George L Cintron 
Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical 
Center: SURVIVAL ACTIONS BASED 
ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
ACCRUE UPON DISCOVERY AND 
FRAUD STATUTE TOLLS TIME FOR 
FILING WRONGFUL DEATH 
ClAIMS 
In Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical 
Center, 313 Md. 301, 545 A.2d 658 (1988), 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that a wrongful death and survival action, 
based on medical malpractice, accrues 
upon discovery of fraud and that Md. Cts. 
& Jud. Proc. Code Ann. 55-203 (1984 
Repl. vol.) operates to toll the time for fil-
ing a wrongful death claim. 
Plaintiff Elaine Geisz (Elaine), as per-
sonal representative of the estate of Steven 
F. Geisz (Geisz) and as mother and next 
friend of Steven Geisz, II, brought a sur-
vival action and a wrongful death claim 
against Greater Baltimore Medical Center 
(GBMC) and Dr. George J. Richards, Jr., 
alleging medical malpractice ten years after 
Geisz died of Hodgkin's disease. The Cir-
cuit Court for Baltimore County entered 
summary judgment in favor of the defen-
dants finding that the survival action 
accrued, as a matter of law, upon the death 
of Geisz and that the Plaintiff failed to 
show facts to support a finding of fraud to 
toll the general three year statute of limita-
tions to bring a wrongful death claim. 
Assuming that the summary judgment 
record could support a finding of fraud, 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
nevertheless held that Elaine and Geisz 
"by the exercise of ordinary diligence 
should have discovered the fraud" more 
than three years prior to the filing of the 
wrongful death claim. Geisz v. GBMC, 71 
Md. App. 538, 526 A.2d 635 (1987). The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted cer-
tiorari to address the issue of whether the 
survival claim and the wrongful death 
action were time barred pursuant to 55-
203. 
In 1971, Geisz had been diagnosed as suf-
fering from Hodgkin's disease and had 
been referred to Dr. Richards, who was 
chief of radiation therapy at GBMC. At 
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that time, Dr. Richards informed Geisz 
that there was a 95% chance of cure. 
Thereafter, under the care of Dr. Richards, 
Geisz began a treatment program of che-
motherapy and radiation therapy. Despite 
Dr. Richards' assurances that Geisz was 
receiving the best care possible, Geisz's 
condition steadily deteriorated. Dr. 
Richards attributed Geisz's failure to 
respond to treatment to Geisz being 
among the 5% of patients who do not 
improve. In 1975, Geisz died of Hodgkin's 
disease. According to plaintifrs experts, 
portal films should have been utilized in 
order to determine the effectiveness of the 
radiation therapy. But at no time during 
the course of Geisz's treatment were portal 
x-rays taken to show whether radiation 
was reaching the intended treatment areas. 
Ten years after Geisz's death, Elaine read 
a newspaper article regarding malpractice 
actions against Dr. Richards, and subse-
quently, instituted these actions. Elaine 
contended that the survival claim did not 
accrue until she had discovered the causes 
of action in the newspaper article. With 
respect to the wrongful death claim, the 
plaintiffs submitted that Dr. Richard's 
statements constituted fraud, within the 
meaning of §5-203, and therefore, the time 
in which to bring the action should be 
measured from the discovery of the fraud. 
The defendants countered that the 
patient's death equated to an accrual for 
purposes of the survival claim. They fur-
ther argued that the three year period for 
bringing the wrongful death claim should 
be measured from Geisz's death. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first 
addressed whether the plaintiffs exercised 
due diligence to discover a cause of action. 
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs 
should have been aware of the malpractice 
since Geisz's condition deteriorated, even 
though the expected cure rate was 95%. 
The court noted that Dr. Richards, in his 
professional capacity at GBMC, assumed 
the responsibility to provide and supervise 
Geisz's treatment. Moreover, the plaintiffs 
believed that Geisz was among the unfor-
tunate percentage of patients who fail to 
respond to treatment. Most important, 
"cancer which was not responding to pro-
per treatment, as contrasted with cancer 
which was being negligently treated, could 
have explained Geisz's deterioration and 
death." Geisz at 317. Therefore, the court 
concluded that the issue as to when the 
plaintiffs should have discovered the sur-
vival claim should have been preserved for 
a jury. 
Next, the court addressed defendants' 
contention that even if the plaintiffs did 
not fail to exercise due diligence, the cause 
of actiQn accrued upon Geisz's death. 
First, the defendants relied on CJ S 5-101, 
which provides that "a civil action at law 
shall be filed within three years from the 
date it accrues." Id By analogy to Trimper 
v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31,501 A.2d 446 
(1985), in which the court held that a sur-
vival action predicated on latent disease 
accrued at death, the defendants argued 
that a survival action based on medical 
malpractice accrued at death. Id. 
In response, the court looked at CJ S 5-
109, which beginning July 1, 1975, estab-
lished that medical malpractice actions 
"shall be filed (1) within five years of the 
time the injury was committed or (2) 
within three years of the date when the 
injury was discovered, whichever is short-
er." Id at 319. Notwithstanding that § 5-
109 does not govern the claim since Geisz's 
injury occurred prior to its enactment, the 
court used § 5-109 for guidance in deciding 
the survival claim. Most persuasive was 
that under § 5-109 a "claim which remains 
undiscovered for more than three years 
after the death of the patient may still be 
brought if instituted within five years of 
the injury."Id. As a result, death of the 
patient has no impact on the limitations 
under § 5-109. Id. Thus if a medical mal-
practice claim was predicated on an injury 
prior to the enactment of § 5-109, then in 
some instances the five year period for 
undiscovered malpractice claims would be 
shortened. Id. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the survival claim was not 
barred under the discovery rule of the 
general three year statute of limitations. 
The court went on to consider whether 
the wrongful death claim was timely filed. 
In an issue of first impression, the court 
discussed the applicability of C] § 5-203, 
which provides: 
"If a party is kept in ignorance of a 
cause of action by the fraud of an 
adverse party, the cause of action shall 
be deemed to accrue at the time when 
the party discovered, or by the exercise 
of ordinary diligence should have dis-
covered the fraud." 
Id. at 322. 
The court concluded that fraud or fraud-
ulent concealment of the cause of action, 
tolled the substantive limitations period in 
the wrongful death statute, CJ § 3-904(g). 
Finally, the court considered whether 
there existed a factual issue that operated 
to keep the plaintiffs in ignorance of a 
wrongful death claim. Relying on Brack 'V. 
Evans, 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963), 
the court reiterated that the fraud element 
of § 5-203 is satisfied when untrue repre-
sentations are made with a reckless dis-
regard for their truth or falsity. Id. at 331. 
Since there was evidence that Dr. Richards 
made representations about Geisz's condi-
tion without the requisite clinical data and 
that it was possible that such statements 
were false, § 5-203 was properly invoked. 
For these reasons the court reversed the 
summary judgment granted in defendants' 
favor in order to preserve to the jury's 
determination as to whether the plaintiffs 
acted with diligence in view of the defen-
dant's representations. 
In summary, this case rep resents a signi-
ficant step toward broadening the substan-
tive interpretation of when a cause of 
action accrues based on the peculiar facts 
of a given case. Specifically, survival 
actions based on medical malpractice do 
not as a matter of law accrue upon death; 
but rather, accrual depends on discovery 
of the cause of action. 
-Kelly Walfred Miller 
A heart attack may start with pres-
sure, fullness, squeezing or 
pain in the middle of your chest. It 
can spread to your shoulders, 
neck or arms. Dizziness, fainting, 
sweating and shortness of 
breath may even occur. If you 
experience any of these symp-
toms for more than two minutes, 
call for emergency medical 
help immediately. The longer you 
wait, the more you risk dying. 
Which can be very painful for 
everyone who cares about you. 
V
.. American Heart 
.: Association 
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